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Abstract:  
 Technologies being used to produce animals providing meat and dairy products are viewed 
by some people as meaningful. Two technologies receiving scrutiny in agriculture are feeding 
food animals beta agonists to improve weight gain and cloning animals to secure offspring with 
specific traits. The technologies enhance the productive capacities of animals so that fewer 
resources are needed to produce meat and dairy products. Yet consumers are not sure they want 
food products with beta agonist residues and produced from clones. In overseeing the safety of 
food products and animals, legislators and regulators in the United States (US) and European 
Union (EU) have developed contrasting provisions overseeing the usage of these technologies. 
An evaluation of heuristics involving information and experiences with bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy and animal production technologies offers support in explaining the US’s and 
EU’s divergent provisions. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Many members of the public are concerned about what they eat and their exposure to injurious 
substances in food products they consume. In the United States (US), 3,000 people die per year 
and one in six people become sick from contaminated foods or beverages (US CDC 2013). Some 
believe food products have been altered from their natural states in ways that are unhealthy due to 
the use of technological advances involving animal feed additives, genetically engineered (GE) 
crops, hormones, irradiation, veterinary drugs, and cloned animals (Bové and Dufour 2001). 
Consumers wanting food items that are not associated with certain technologies are offering to 
pay more for such products. A market for specialized food products as can be seen in thriving 
organic and locally-grown food markets. 
 This paper looks at governmental oversight of two technologies: the use of animal feed 
additives containing beta agonists and food animal cloning. These two technologies are being 
employed by producers of food animals because they reduce the resources needed to produce 
2 
 
meat and dairy products. With fewer resources required, producers may be more competitive and 
more land is available to grow crops for human consumption. Simultaneously, the technologies 
are accompanied by concerns about food safety, animal welfare, and non-scientific factors. 
Despite the evaluation of the same science involved with these technologies, the oversight by 
governments in the US and European Union (EU) has been different. The EU banned the use of 
beta agonists food animal production in 1996 (EU 1996), while the US approved their use in 
animal feed in the 2000s. With respect to cloning, a report by the EU in 2015 noted the 
importance of animal health and welfare in responding with restrictions on cloned products 
(European Commission 2015). However, regulators in the US found no significant distinctions 
concerning animal welfare. The two technologies have gained approval for their use in the US but 
EU countries have thwarted their widespread adoption. 
 When addressing differences about the regulation of food products by the US and EU, the 
most common explanation is the application of the precautionary principle. This principle was 
adopted to apply to food law as part of an EU regulation adopted in 2002. Whenever “the 
possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional 
risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the 
Community may be adopted” (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
2002).   
 Some Americans maintain that the precautionary principle fails to incorporate “sound 
science,” which should govern the acceptance of food products (US Congress 2003). The 
inference of the American concern is that the precautionary principle is a disguised barrier to 
trade that allows a minority opinion to form the basis for precluding a product (Lupien 2002). 
This includes the use of the principle by the EU as a justification for banning meat products 
containing beta agonist residues (Lively 2013). However, research on risks related to other 
technologies suggests that American regulations impose more precaution for many situations 
(Weiner et al. 2014). This supports a conclusion that precaution may not form the dividing line 
for the transatlantic discord between the US and EU on animal production practices involving 
inputs such as beta agonists and cloning.  
 The objective of this paper is to analyze why the US and EU approach the regulation of beta 
agonists and cloning differently. By looking at availability of information and experiences with 
technologies already being used in animal production, justifications may be discerned for the 
conflicting interpretations of similar data. Affect and availability heuristics led decisionmakers in 
the US and EU to interpret the risks of beta agonists and cloning differently.  
 
2. Materials and methods   
 
2.1. Beta agonist feed additives 
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The technology of using of beta-adrenergic agonist drugs (beta agonists) as additives in livestock 
feed is accompanied by residues in meat products that may pose a risk to human health. The use 
of beta agonists has been approved in the United States and Canada, and the Codex Alimentarius 
has adopted international acceptable daily intake limits for these substances. Conversely, the 
European Union and most other countries feel the residues pose health risks. They have adopted 
provisions to exclude meat products containing residues of these drugs.  
 Ractopamine hydrochloride and zilpaterol hydrochloride are beta agonist drugs fed to 
selected food animals to enhance muscle growth, improve feed efficiency, and limit the amount 
of fat in meat products (Mersmann 2002). Ractopamine was approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (US FDA) for use in swine in 2000 and cattle in 2003 (US FDA 2000, 2003), and 
zilpaterol was approved by the US FDA for use in cattle in 2006 (US FDA 2006). These drugs 
activate protein synthesis and decrease protein degradation on a cellular level in food animals to 
stimulate skeletal muscle growth without increasing natural hormone levels (Gonzalez et al. 
2007). Thus, they cause protein accretion that increases animals’ hot carcass weight and improve 
yield grade with corresponding economic benefits for producers (Boyd et al. 2015). American 
livestock producers are feeding their animals beta agonists because of the economic advantages 
(Lean et al. 2014).  
 Yet many important meat importing countries have claimed that there may be potential 
human health problems from beta agonists and have adopted policies to preclude the sale of 
products containing beta agonist residues (Bories et al. 2009). Beta agonist drug residues in food 
products are known to adversely affect humans, although there are no reported cases of humans 
being adversely affected by livestock products containing zilpaterol or ractopamine residues 
(Baynes et al. 2016).  
 Concern also exists about the welfare of animals (American Veterinary Medical Association 
2014; Loneragan et al. 2014). Evidence suggest that beta agonists lead to fatigued cattle 
syndrome that are manifested through labored breathing, reluctance to move, and lameness 
(Grandin 2013; Thomson et al. 2015). In 2013, the drug firm Merck took its zilpaterol feed 
additive off the market due to its negative effects on animal health (Hughlett 2013). Research on 
pigs suggest that those fed beta agonists exhibited more aggressive behaviors and a greater 
number of offensive behaviors, particularly bites (Poletto et al. 2010). With these data, 
justifications exist for deciding that usage for animal production is contrary to acceptable norms 
for the production of food animals. 
 
2.2. Food animal cloning  
 
Food animal cloning involves the use of cloning in food animals by using the somatic cell 
nucleus transfer (SCNT) cloning technique (Edwards et al. 2003). The main objectives of 
reproductive animal cloning for livestock are to increase reproductive efficiency, enhance animal 
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genetic improvement, and to increase resistance to disease (Liu et al. 2016; US FDA 2014, 2015). 
In agriculture, cloning generates animals for breeding. The offspring of clones are used for food 
production.  
 
2.2.1. Agency risk assessments 
 
The US FDA and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) reviewed similar scientific 
evidence of the SCNT cloning technique to determine whether animal cloning and its derived 
foods were safe (US Center for Veterinary Medicine 2008; EFSA 2008). Their 2008 risk 
assessments were science-based and focused on problems with genetic reprogramming, animal 
health risks, and food consumption risks. The agencies concluded that animal clones and their 
offspring are similar to their conventional counterparts and that the safety of meat and milk of 
clones and their progeny compared with those from conventionally bred animals (Petetin 2009). 
However, a closer examination shows that the agencies reached different conclusions regarding 
the health of animals (Table 1).  
------------------------ 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------ 
 The US FDA noted a higher proportion of health risks for cloned animals, but concluded 
that the risks did not qualitatively differ from natural breeding (US Center for Veterinary 
Medicine 2008). Because the US FDA risk assessment found no science-based reason to require 
labels to distinguish between products from clones and products from conventionally produced 
animals, products from cloned animals are not labeled in the United States (US FDA 2008).  
The EFSA delineated issues of welfare and health of the surrogate dams carrying the 
cloned offspring (EFSA 2012). The dams were affected by abnormal pregnancies that included 
abortions. The agency also noted that the cloning efficiency of cattle, namely the percentage of 
viable offspring born from transferred embryo clones, is low at about 6-15% for bovine animals 
and about 6% for pigs (EFSA 2012; European Commission 2013b). Moreover, the EFSA 
expressed concerns about animal suffering as an increased percentage of clones have been found 
to be adversely affected, often severely and with a fatal outcome, compared to sexually produced 
animals (EFSA 2008). This led the EFSA to conclude that the welfare of a significant proportion 
of clones was negatively impacted, leading the EU to take a protectionist approach to this 
technology (Petetin 2012). With respect to the safety of food products from cloned animals, the 
EFSA did not make any risk management decision because its authority is limited to independent 
scientific evidence.  
 
2.2.2. The policies and regulation of cloned foods  
 
5 
 
The approach of the US FDA to cloned foods was founded on the 1986 Coordinated Framework 
of Biotechnology (US Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986). Because cloned food 
raised no unique risk, no new laws were needed to respond to challenges posed by this 
technology (US FDA 2008). The US FDA declared that cloned foods are basically as safe as 
traditional foods so they do not require any specific labeling information on cloning. However, 
the US FDA recommended that cloned species other than cows, goats, and pigs should not enter 
the human food supply (US FDA 2008). 
 The EU regulation of cloned foods falls under the scope of the 2015 Novel Foods 
Regulation (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2015). Cloned foods 
are considered as novel foods and must be pre-authorized. A novel food is labeled to inform 
consumers whenever it is no longer equivalent to an existing food (Petetin 2017). Novel foods 
that give rise to ethical concerns may require additional specific labeling. The 2015 Novel Foods 
Regulation taking effect on 1 January 2018 simplifies the framework for novel foods (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2015). The regulation creates a centralized 
authorization system for novel foods and establishes the EFSA at the center of the risk 
assessment. It applies to cloned foods until more specific legislation is enacted. 
 Foods derived from the descendants of cloned animals fall outside the scope of the 
definition of a novel food under the 2015 Novel Foods Regulations. This means that products of 
descendants of cloned animals are not subject to the pre-market authorization, labeling, or 
traceability requirements of these regulations. Since the descendants of clones will provide food 
products, consumers will not know whether their food was derived from a cloned animal unless 
new requirements are imposed.  
Dissatisfaction with the existing regulations on cloned food led the EU Commission to 
submit two separate proposals dealing with animal cloning and derived foods in 2013. The first 
proposal was for a Directive on Animal Cloning for Farming Purposes that would provisionally 
ban such practices (European Commission 2013a). The second complementary proposal was for 
a Directive on Cloned Foods that would temporarily prohibit the placing on the market products 
from clones as well as their importation (European Commission 2013b).  
 
2.3. Affect and availability heuristics 
 
Decisions about risk are influenced by affect and availability heuristics, the mental shortcuts 
people take when making judgments and choices. An affect heuristic involves a person’s 
response to a risk based on experiences (Pachur et al. 2012). The availability heuristic looks at 
the information available to persons making decisions (Mase et al. 2015).  
 Affect and availability heuristics may influence decisions made by three groups of persons 
who determine safeguards that will govern animal meat products. The first group of 
decisionmakers is composed of the scientists who select what to examine, how the examination 
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will proceed, and how to interpret the findings. While scientists are highly trained and seek to be 
objective in verifying scientific accounts of nature, science is messy (Lather 2010). Scientists do 
not have a set of standardized questions or rules to follow; rather, they decide what questions 
should be asked (Haack 2003). Scientists decide what experiments to conduct, so make choices 
based on their knowledge and past experiences.  
 A second group of decisionmakers is comprised of legislators who enact provisions 
governing the use of technologies. They have choices in determining which scientific findings are 
the most credible, whether oversight is needed, and what limitations to establish. Opinions of 
constituents and advocacy groups, which may not be based on science, are often important 
(Miller 2009). Once legislative pronouncements have been made, regulators are in charge of 
developing regulations to implement the legislation. They may evaluate the same science as the 
scientists, but may make choices influenced by legislative directives, staffing, available expertise, 
and timeframes (US FDA 2010).  
 When scientists, legislators, and regulators assess the risks of new technologies, such as 
beta agonists and cloned food products, their past experiences with related technologies may 
influence their evaluations of risk (Miller 2009). The availability of information on related 
technologies and the regulation of these technologies also may impact their evaluations (EFSA 
2014). Given uncertainties that accompany the assessment of risks, heuristics may lead individual 
decisionmakers to weigh risks of new technologies dissimilarly and to ascribe divergent levels of 
precaution to accompanying risks (Stoutenborough et al. 2016). Due to their unique backgrounds 
and locations, individuals weigh risks of the same technology differently.  
 Cultural differences between the US and EU on food safety may have also influenced 
evaluations of risk. Europeans may have a greater adversity to dread and unknown risk (Finucane 
et al. 2005). They also have been more supportive of actions to improve the welfare of food 
animals (Matheny and Leahy, 2007). 
 
2.4. Animal production technologies 
 
Heuristics related to other animal production technologies would be expected to influence 
decisionmakers. An examination of the agricultural law literature over the past two decades 
discloses several technologies for which the US and EU proceeded differently with their 
regulatory oversight. Based on the contrasting decisions concerning authorization to use these 
technologies, six are selected for further evaluation and assess how they may have influenced 
decisionmakers who evaluated risks accompanying the use of beta agonists and cloning. While 
decision makers on both sides of the Atlantic would have had access to considerable information 
about the technologies, they would have been exposed to different governmental and public 
attitudes about the technologies. In approaching their evaluations of beta agonists and cloning, 
decisionmakers would be expected to maintain consistency with established cultural institutions 
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and public sentiments. Legislators and regulators in the EU had already adopted regulations 
forbidding the use of steroidal hormones, recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), and some 
non-therapeutic antibiotics (EC 1981, 1988; EU, 1996, 1998b), whereas in the US the use of 
these production inputs was considered important to the viability of the country’s livestock 
industry. Decisionmakers in both the US and EU would have had access to information on their 
existing regulatory controls over concentrations of animals, tail docking, and castration of pigs 
without anesthesia.  
 The analysis of responses of US and EU regulators and producers to six animal 
production technologies shows a pattern (Table 2). Regulators in the US allowed the technologies 
to be adopted accompanied by measures to prevent harm. Considerable numbers of producers in 
the US embraced the technologies to maintain profitability and to enhance economic returns. 
However, EU regulators applied limitations and prohibitions. For those technologies allowed in 
the EU, producers were more reluctant to adopt them and expressed greater concern for animal 
welfare.  
------------------------ 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------ 
 The use of steroidal hormones in the production of food animals is a technology that is 
regulated in the US and EU. The US Department of Agriculture commended the use of hormones 
in 1991 and, due to the economic advantages of adopting these agents, a significant number of 
US producers commenced using them. Steroidal hormones being used are estradiol benzoate, 
estradiol 17β, melengestrol acetate, progesterione, testosterone, trenbolone acetate, and zaranol 
(Schweihofer and Buskirk 2016). In contrast, the European Community adopted a directive to 
preclude the administration of steroidal hormones in 1981 that was amplified through additional 
directives (EC 1981, 1988; EU 1996). These provisions show a sustained antipathy to the use of 
steroidal hormones in food animal production in the EU.  
 The use of rBST in dairy cows is a second production technology. The use of this 
technology is approved in the US but proscribed in the EU. In 1993, the US FDA approved the 
use of rBST in lactating dairy cows for the purpose of increasing the production of marketable 
milk (US FDA 1993). Subsequently, this artificial hormone is available for use in the US in 
contrast with the EU where the use of rBST is banned (EU 1999).  
 Another technology used for producing food animals on some farms involves the 
administration of non-therapeutic antibiotics. The US continues the use of these substances to 
enhance animal growth, although recent limitations should decrease usage (Centner 2016; 
Sneeringer et al. 2015). This may be contrasted to the EU’s 1998 regulation limiting the use of 
certain antibiotics in animal production (EU 1998a).  
 Governmental limitations on tail docking of pigs, including allowing the procedure 
without anesthesia, involve the use of a technology related to animal welfare. Tail docking is 
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done to reduce biting by other pigs in confined areas (Larsen et al. 2015). Docking may have 
negative consequences on the welfare of the docked pig consisting of acute pain and possibly 
long-term pain with the formation of neuromas in the tail stump (EFSA 2007). Tail docking is 
prevalent in the US and is usually preformed a few days after birth without analgesia (Sutherland 
and Tucker 2011). In the EU, tail docking of pigs is only allowed where there is evidence that 
injuries to other pigs’ tails have occurred (EU 2001; EU 2008; European Commission 2001).  
 The castration of male pigs without anesthesia involves another technology related to 
animal welfare (EU 2008). In both the US and EU, it is generally performed without anesthesia or 
post-operative analgesia even though the vocalization of animals suggests it is painful (Rault et 
al. 2011). However, an EU council directive requires castration of pigs older than seven days be 
performed by a veterinarian using an anesthetic agent (EU 2008). 
 A major difference between the US and EU concerning the production of livestock is that 
large cattle feedlots and integrated pig and poultry operations are prevalent in the US (US 
Government Accountability Office 2008). The assemblage of large numbers of animals at 
production units known as concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) creates economies of 
scale. In the EU, while farms have increased in size, there has not been the same embracement of 
CAFOs as occurred in the US. Under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, the EU chose to 
focus on protecting small-scale farming viability (Barnes et al. 2016). With direct payments to 
farmers and an emphasis on farm diversification and environmental maintenance, producers in 
the EU retained their holdings.  
 A majority of these six technologies have been available for public scrutiny for more than 
a decade. Decisionmakers in the US and EU would have had information on public attitudes, 
practices by agricultural producers, activities by business firms, and agendas of special interest 
groups about these technologies. The prevalence of use of these technologies in the US and their 
limited use or prohibition in the EU means that American and European decisionmakers had 
different information, experiences, and beliefs when called upon to regulate beta agonists and 
cloning.  
 Given the prohibitions on using steroidal hormones, rBST, and some non-therapeutic 
antibiotics in the EU, it was consistent for decision makers to assess the risks and apply 
precaution in a manner that led to reaffirming the EU ban on beta agonists and the possible ban of 
food animal cloning. Animal health concerns in the EU, expressed in regulations on tail docking 
and castration, supported a finding that food animal cloning had adverse effects on surrogate 
dams. Affect and availability heuristics caused EU decisionmakers to be concerned about the 
potential for meat products to contain unhealthy residues and failing to maintain the well-being of 
food animals that had been expressed in earlier regulations governing other technologies. In the 
US, decisionmakers observed public acceptance of meat products from animals administered 
steroidal hormones and antibiotics as well as the stressful conditions for animals confined at 
CAFOs. With these observations, US decisionmakers concluded that the use of beta agonists and 
9 
 
cloning were simply two additional technologies that could be made available to producers to 
reduce the costs of animal production. 
 
3. Results  
 
The use of beta agonists and cloning in food animal production show differences in opinion on 
what actions governments should take to address risks accompanying new technologies. 
Governments can choose not to act and allow new technologies to be unregulated, but legislative 
bodies in both the US and the EU have felt that beta agonists and cloning need to be regulated to 
protect animals, people, and the environment. However, the regulatory oversight in the US and 
EU has led to contrasting results. The evaluation of how scientists, legislators, and regulators 
assess risk and apply precaution helps explain the different conclusions on regulating these 
technologies. The decisionmakers in the US and EU viewed information differently given diverse 
regulatory institutions, market structure, interest groups, public attitudes, and politics. 
Concomitant with these various perspectives, decisionmakers would interpret data on beta 
agonists and cloning based on personal experiences, a perceived need to be consistent with 
regulations of other animal production technologies, and value judgments about the welfare of 
humans and food animals.  
 
3.1. Assessing risk 
 
Risk plays a crucial role in the regulation of foods and is especially significant since scientific 
evidence is often inconclusive. Although scientific risk assessments may be perceived to be 
value-free, neutral, and unbiased (Haack 2003), scientific inquiry incorporates notions of risk and 
conceptions of scientific evidence (Kang 2013). Technologies include uncertainties, choices for 
perspectives, and value-loadings, so are not comprised of stand-alone, factual answers (Saltelli 
and Funtowicz 2004). Rather, the evaluation of risk involves defining risks, analysing 
inconclusive scientific evidence, making assumptions, assigning probabilities, and discerning 
acceptable levels of potential damages.  
 While the evaluation of risk accompanying beta agonists and cloning involves scientific 
evidence, legislative and regulatory decisions to protect people, animals, and the environment 
involve values of the decisionmakers. For beta agonists, the EU’s prohibition is to protect the 
health of people. The EFSA Panel on Additives and Products or Substances used in Animal Feed 
concluded that there was no human study from which to derive an acceptable daily intake for beta 
agonist residues (Bories et al. 2009). This precluded the calculation of tolerances (maximum 
residue limits) for meat products so any product with a residue is unacceptable. For cloning, the 
EU’s decision was not based on human health concerns but rather considered the evidence that 
the technology adversely affected the welfare of animals. It was felt that surrogate dams and 
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animal clones had too many health problems (European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies 2008). 
 In addressing beta agonists and cloning, the US FDA and the EFSA had nearly identical 
scientific data about the technologies, yet the agencies’ assessments led to different policies. 
While the US decided to allow producers to use beta agonists and allows the cloning of food 
animals, the EU proscribed beta agonists and addresses cloning as a novel food. One explanation 
for the divergent assessment of risk is the heuristics affecting the decisionmakers. As a result of 
decisionmakers’ experiences with the six noted animal production technologies, affect and 
availability heuristics influenced their evaluations of risk and their decisions on how much 
precaution was needed to protect people, animals, and the environment. These heuristics may 
account for the discrepancies in the US and EU regulations on beta agonists and cloning.  
 
3.2. Welfare of food animals 
 
For cloning, the EU decisionmakers interpreted the data to conclude that the technology adversely 
affects surrogate dams and some offspring. By finding differences in the health of surrogate dams 
and cloned offspring, the decisionmakers in the EU acknowledged that animal welfare is 
important and could constitute a justification for not approving a new technology.  
 In 1998, the EU acknowledged concern for the welfare of animals produced for food with 
its adoption of a directive on the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (EU 1998b). 
The 1998 directive provided the foundation for subsequent decisions to safeguard the welfare of 
food animals. In 1999, the Scientific Committee on Animals Health and Welfare concluded that 
rBST increases risks of clinical mastitis, the duration of treatment of mastitis, the incidence of 
foot and leg disorders, adversely affects reproduction, and induces severe reactions at the 
injection site (EU 1999). Based on these findings, the EU prohibited the use of rBST. The EU 
decisions on tail docking and castration of pigs also were based on animal welfare concerns 
(EFSA 2007; EU 2001, 2008). Given these precedents regarding the treatment of food animals 
and the assessments of dams and offspring, the decisionmakers consider it “prudent to 
provisionally prohibit the use of cloning in animal production for farm purposes of certain 
species” (EC 2013a).  
 In the US, common law traditionally treats non-human animals as property. Individual US 
states have enacted animal cruelty laws to prevent abusive behavior, but these often do not 
address most issues affecting the welfare of food animals. Moreover, they are not always 
enforced (Friedrich and Wilson 2015). In the absence of significant regulatory provisions 
protecting animal welfare in the US, decisionmakers declined to recognize any concerns about 
the health of surrogate dams used for cloning. 
 
4. Discussion 
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Citizens of the US and EU have a lot in common. Both the US and the EU have approached the 
issue of food safety with great diligence, and have adopted a wide array of provisions to protect 
people from harmful substances and products. Both America and Europe are known for their safe 
food products. Yet, they have not approached all issues in the same manner. The evaluation of 
beta agonists and cloning shows that the US FDA and the EFSA have approached the risks 
involving these technologies differently. 
 For beta agonists, the US FDA has set acceptable daily intake levels and tolerance levels 
whereas the EU has decided that residues are unacceptable due to human health concerns. For 
animal cloning, the US FDA found no distinctions in products from cloned animals so no further 
regulation was needed whereas the EU found the technology adversely affected animal health.  
In applying the precautionary principle, the EU grants regulators discretion in regulating 
risk that can lead to products being banned (Morag-Levine 2014). However, the US also applies 
precaution in regulating risk. A comprehensive study of the application of precaution by the US 
and EU showed that political and institutional factors, legal systems, and the role of cost-benefit 
analyses did not account for the observed patterns of precaution (Weiner et al. 2014). Rather, the 
authors concluded that heuristic availability provided more important clues about the use of the 
precautionary principle and cross-cultural differences in risk perception (Weiner et al. 2014). 
 Heuristic availability is access to information that will affect a person’s memory (Geurten 
et al. 2015). By drawing on personal experiences and individual senses, the availability heuristic 
affects people’s perceptions of risk and regulatory oversight (Mase et al. 2015). For beta agonists 
and cloning, persons who evaluated the risks, applied precaution, and authored the regulations 
had experiences and information that may have impacted their perceptions of the regulatory needs 
of these technologies. Since both of these technologies dealt with food animals, decisionmakers 
may have been influenced by events and existing regulatory controls over six agricultural 
technologies related to animal well-being and wholesome food (Table 2).  
 For decisionmakers in the EU, the affect heuristic may include public and governmental 
responses to the potential introduction of GE crops and the use of ruminant-derived protein in 
animal feed. Public concerns over the introduction of GE crops contributed to a strengthened 
precautionary principle including its application to food items (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union 2002). In 1985, ruminant-derived protein was related to an 
outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease, in the 
United Kingdom (Burka 2011). Ten years later, BSE was related to humans dying from 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. This development caused the public to become more skeptical of 
governmental regulations (Jasanoff 2005). In the United Kingdom, 176 human deaths were 
connected to the disease, with deaths peaking in 2000 (Andrews 2012).  
Given the seriousness of the Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease outbreak in the UK, 
decisionmakers in the EU were likely to have had an enhanced concern about health dangers that 
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might accompany the use of new technologies. With this background, the regulatory climate of 
the EU was less favorable to the use of steroidal hormones, rBST, non-therapeutic antibiotics, 
concentrations of animals, tail docking, and castration without anesthesia. When the 
decisionmakers analyzed the data concerning potential health effects related to beta agonist 
residues in meat products, they wanted to avoid another adverse public health problem so 
concluded that usage of beta agonists was not safe for humans. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The regulatory agencies of the US and EU applied precaution in reaching their decisions on the 
use of beta agonists and cloning but delineated contrasting responses. While the application of the 
precautionary principle by the EU is offered as explaining the differences, an evaluation of affect 
and availability heuristics offers an alternative explanation. The decisionmakers evaluated risks 
differently. American decisionmakers had information and experiences showing widespread 
acceptance by regulators of new animal production technologies, including steroidal hormones, 
rBST, non-therapeutic antibiotics, and other production practices. While there was concern about 
animal health and welfare, it was not at the level expressed in EU directives.  
 However, European decisionmakers had very different information and experiences. 
Decisionmakers would have known about the existing EU prohibitions on steroidal hormones, 
rBST, and non-therapeutic antibiotics. Turning to the issue of animal welfare, EU decisionmakers 
were constrained by the directive to ensure animals are not caused unnecessary suffering (EU 
1998b). In regulating cloning, decisionmakers would want to be consistent with the animal 
welfare standards embodied in directives on tail docking and castration. Furthermore, due to the 
disease outbreak of BSE, EU decisionmakers may have had negative emotional reactions to new 
animal technologies.  
 The analysis shows that decisionmakers in the US and EU adopted precaution in devising 
regulations over beta agonists and cloning. However, despite the internationalization of food 
safety standards, past experiences led decisionmakers in the US and EU to assess risk differently, 
caused the EU to have a greater concern about potential harm, and led the Americans to decline 
to find any adverse health concerns for animals receiving the technologies. While the EU’s 
precautionary principle facilitates rejecting technologies, the use of beta agonists and cloning 
were unacceptable because their usage would not be consistent with regulations governing other 
animal production technologies. Decisionmakers in the US and EU developed divergent 
regulatory approaches on the use of beta agonists and cloning technologies due to affect and 
availability heuristics.  
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Table 1 
Comparison of the evaluation of food animal cloning in the US and EU.* 
 United States European Union 
Evaluation setting food risks novel food 
Safety of cloned food products yes yes 
Health of dams carrying clones compared 
to other dams 
comparable inferior health 
Welfare of cloned animals compared to 
non-clones 
comparable inferior welfare 
Products of offspring of cloned animals no differences no differences 
Evaluation of ethical concerns none occurred European Group on Ethics in Science 
and New Technologies  
Public opposition to cloning some significant 
Establishing safeguards voluntary 
moratorium  
developing special directives or a 
regulation to preclude sale of 
products 
* US Center for Veterinary Medicine 2008; EFSA 2012; European Commission 2013b. 
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Table 2 
Prevalence of use of selected animal production technologies (+ means greater use; - means less use). 
 
Practice US EU Reference 
Steroidal hormones + - USDA 2013; EC1981, 1988; EU 1996 
Recombinant bovine somatotropin + -  Wolf et al. 2011; Brinkman 2000; EU 1999 
Non-therapeutic antibiotics + - Sneeringer et al. 2015; EU 1998 
Concentrations of animals + - US Government Accountability Office 2008; European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2004 
Tail docking + - Rault et al. 2011; EU 2008 
Castration without anesthesia 
 
+ - Rault et al. 2011; EU 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
